Definitions

A situation in which a personnel member dedicates time to personal activities in excess of the time permitted by institutional policy, or to other activities that may detract from his or her primary responsibility to the institution.

An individual’s interest in a business enterprise including stock ownership, stock option(s), and/or other ownership interest.

1. An actual shipment or transmission out of the United States, including the sending or taking of an item out of the United States, in any manner.
2. Releasing or otherwise transferring controlled “technology” or source code (but not object code) to a foreign person in the United States (a “deemed export”). Any release in the United States of “technology” or source code to a foreign person is a deemed export to the foreign person’s most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency.
3. A domestic transfer of controlled items or technology with the knowledge that such will be transferred internationally.

A situation in which an investigator’s significant financial interest could directly and significantly affect the design, conduct, or reporting of research.

The performance of any significant scientific element or segment of a project outside of the United States, either by the recipient or by a researcher employed by a foreign organization, whether or not grant funds are expended.

Foreign Country of Concern is defined by Florida Statute as the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the Venezuelan regime of Nicolás Maduro, or the Syrian Arab Republic, including any agency of or any other entity under significant control of such foreign country of concern.

The term “foreign influence” has been coined by various federal agencies, but there is no consistent definition. Generally, the term refers to a set of actions carried out by a foreign entity against a U.S. party/parties, by which the foreign party positions itself to obtain a benefit not intended for it (potentially by illegal means). “Foreign influence” is often used to illegally obtain U.S. intellectual property and technology, compromise U.S. computer systems, and/or affect the course of U.S. research to benefit the foreign instigator(s).

Any natural person who is not a lawful permanent resident or who is not a protected individual [with refugee or asylee status]. The terms also incorporates any foreign corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society or any other entity or group that is not incorporated or organized to do business in the United States, as well as international organizations, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments (e.g. diplomatic missions).

A program administered by a foreign government and/or entity that solicits U.S. scholars for teaching, research, and service on behalf of that entity, while the individual is employed by a U.S. institution. Recipients of foreign talent awards often receive financial support and in-kind services in exchange for performing activities that may result in the transfer of cutting-edge technology and intellectual property to the foreign country. This type of program may also be positioned as an award or prize to support a foreign national’s study, research, employment, and/or visa application in the United States.

Non-cash resources provided to a researcher, including items, supplies, equipment, services, labor, etc.

Occurs between the institution and an international institution for the purposes of joint development, education, research, or other professional activities. Examples include development of a joint degree program, development of a jointly owned foreign institution, etc.

Any individual who works for or on behalf of a non-U.S. entity and engages with one or more institutional personnel for the purposes of teaching, lecturing, performing research, or engaging in other professional activities, and where such engagement occurs outside of the United States.

Research, training, and/or education carried out in cooperation with international counterparts either overseas or in the U.S. using virtual technologies.

Any person who is responsible for the design, conduct, or reporting of research funded by PHS, or proposed for such funding (including collaborators or consultants).

Something of value that is given to the institution by a donor who expects nothing of significant value in return, other than recognition of the gift and its disposition in accordance with the donor’s wishes. A gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment, hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having monetary value. It includes services as well as gifts of training, transportation, local travel, lodgings, and meals.

“A malign foreign talent recruitment program is:
(A) any program, position, or activity that includes compensation in the form of cash, in-kind
compensation, including research funding, promised future compensation, complimentary foreign
travel, things of non de minimis value, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, or other
types of remuneration or consideration directly provided by a foreign country at any level
(national, provincial, or local) or their designee, or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with
a foreign country, whether or not directly sponsored by the foreign country, to the targeted
individual, whether directly or indirectly stated in the arrangement, contract, or other
documentation at issue, in exchange for the individual—
(i) engaging in the unauthorized transfer of intellectual property, materials, data products, or
other nonpublic information owned by a United States entity or developed with a Federal
research and development award to the government of a foreign country or an entity
based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country regardless of whether that
government or entity provided support for the development of the intellectual property,
materials, or data products;
(ii) being required to recruit trainees or researchers to enroll in such program, position, or
activity;
(iii) establishing a laboratory or company, accepting a faculty position, or undertaking any
other employment or appointment in a foreign country or with an entity based in, funded
by, or affiliated with a foreign country if such activities are in violation of the standard
terms and conditions of a Federal research and development award;
(iv) being unable to terminate the foreign talent recruitment program contract or agreement
except in extraordinary circumstances;
(v) through funding or effort related to the foreign talent recruitment program, being limited
in the capacity to carry out a research and development award or required to engage in
work that would result in substantial overlap or duplication with a Federal research and
development award;
(vi) being required to apply for and successfully receive funding from the sponsoring foreign
government's funding agencies with the sponsoring foreign organization as the recipient;
(vii) being required to omit acknowledgment of the recipient institution with which the
individual is affiliated, or the Federal research agency sponsoring the research and
development award, contrary to the institutional policies or standard terms and conditions
of the Federal research and development award;
(viii) being required to not disclose to the Federal research agency or employing institution the
participation of such individual in such program, position, or activity; or
(ix) having a conflict of interest or conflict of commitment contrary to the standard terms and
conditions of the Federal research and development award; and
(B) a program that is sponsored by—
(i) a foreign country of concern or an entity based in a foreign country of concern, whether
or not directly sponsored by the foreign country of concern;10
(ii) an academic institution on the list developed under section 1286(c)(8) of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note;
Public Law 115-232); or
(iii) a foreign talent recruitment program on the list developed under section 1286(c)(9) of the
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C.
4001 note; Public Law 115-232).”

Source

Any person or entity whose actions or functions are intended to support ‘military end uses’ (as defined above), including the national armed services (army, navy, marine, air force, or coast guard), as well as the national guard and national police, government intelligence or reconnaissance organizations. (15 CFR 744.21(g)).

In general – any monetary and/or in-kind input by a foreign entity into institutional intellectual property (“IP”), equipment, facilities, and/or programs.

For NIH and NSF awards – includes all financial resources, whether Federal, non-Federal, commercial or institutional, available in direct support of an individual’s research endeavors, including but not limited to research grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, and/or institutional awards.

Includes salary and any payment for services not otherwise identified as salary (e.g., consulting fees, honoraria, paid authorship).

Entities (or persons) located anywhere in the world (including the U.S) identified by the U.S. Federal Government as threats to national security, U.S. trade policy, global nuclear and biologic safety, etc. These entities include certain foreign universities and non-academic research institutions. The U.S. Government publishes and updates the names of such entities and persons in the Federal Register on an ongoing basis. U.S. universities and research institutions are often solicited by Restricted Entities/Parties who wish to benefit from a research, education, or business relationship. In general, U.S. persons and institutions are prohibited from engaging in any export controlled transactions with a Restricted Entity/Party and, depending on the scope of restriction, engaging in financial and service-related transactions as well.

Refers to individuals who are specifically and uniquely important to the study. Key Personnel typically includes the principal investigators and co-investigators but is dependent upon the individual award.

Significant Financial Interest of a spouse or dependent children must be disclosed in accordance with the rules for reporting a Significant Financial Interest.

Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section1754(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961). Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are four countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism: Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, and Syria.

Any foreign national individual who is currently a faculty member, post-doctoral, doctoral, or graduate-level student coming to FIU from a foreign institution under a U.S. visa program (or who is already present at another U.S. institution under a visa program and is transferring to FIU under that visa program) for purposes of teaching, lecturing, performing research, and/or similar professional activities. This includes both compensated and non-compensated positions.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) University Tracker (Unitracker) is a database of Chinese institutions engaged in military or security-related science and technology research. It includes entries on nearly 100 civilian universities, 50 People’s Liberation Army institutions, China’s nuclear weapons program, three Ministry of State Security institutions, four Ministry of Public Security universities, and 12 state-owned defense industry conglomerates. Funded in part by the U.S. State Department, the ASPI Unitracker is considered an important and reliable intelligence tool by U.S. enforcement agencies in evaluating risks associated with engaging with ASPI watch-listed Chinese institutions. As such, many U.S. universities now utilize the Unitracker’s risk indices to evaluate existing and potential relationships with ASPI-listed entities, including for example fundamental research collaborations, academic exchanges and outside activity engagements by individual faculty members.